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Abstract 
Over the past years, a series of bilateral disputes between EU member states and 
Moscow have significantly affected EU–Russian relations and exposed sharp internal 
divisions over the EU’s approach towards Russia. Despite their potential for having a 
highly disruptive impact on EU foreign policy, the EU still lacks a consensus on how 
to handle bilateral disputes. This paper employs a case-study approach to provide an 
in-depth analysis of selected disputes and reviews several questions of importance 
for the coherence of EU policy towards Russia: What kinds of issues are at the 
centre of bilateral disputes? What strategies do member states adopt to resolve 
them? Under what circumstances are disputes raised to the EU level? The paper 
concludes that the scope of ‘EU solidarity’ in bilateral disputes remains deeply 
contested and draws on insights from the case studies to propose a set of guidelines 
for the EU’s approach to bilateral disputes. 
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* 
1. Introduction 
In November 2006, Poland’s veto of the EU–Russia negotiating directives brought the issue of 
bilateral disputes with Moscow into the public spotlight and illustrated their potential for having 
a highly disruptive impact on EU–Russian relations. Over the subsequent months, a series of 
incidents including the Litvinenko affair, the Mazeikiu refinery dispute and the Estonian 
monument crisis suggested that bilateral disputes were quickly beginning to dominate EU–
Russian relations. 
To some degree, this rapid focus of attention was unwarranted. Bilateral disputes did not 
suddenly appear in EU–Russian relations with the 2004 enlargement or Russia’s growing 
international assertiveness. In the mid-1990s, for example, Russian import restrictions over 
alleged sanitary shortcomings caused significant difficulties for the Finnish egg sector and 
prompted Helsinki to push for a strong EU response. In the wake of the theatre hostage crisis in 
Moscow in October 2002, a conflict over Denmark’s refusal to cancel the World Chechen 
Congress in Copenhagen threatened to disrupt an upcoming EU–Russia summit and forced 
Denmark to move the summit venue to Brussels. 
Furthermore, bilateral disputes are by no means exclusive to EU–Russian relations and they 
have seriously affected the EU’s ties with other third countries. In 1994–95, Greece temporarily 
obstructed the conclusion of the EC–Turkey Customs Union Agreement owing to concerns 
about the implications of the unresolved Cyprus conflict for the island’s future EU membership. 
The conflict continues to plague Ankara’s accession negotiations, which have inter alia 
witnessed the freezing of eight crucial negotiating chapters over the Cyprus issue. Bilateral 
disputes also threaten to disrupt the enlargement process elsewhere in south-eastern Europe, 
notably in the shape of the Slovenian–Croatian border dispute and the Macedonia naming 
dispute. In late 2008, Beijing postponed an upcoming EU–China summit over a planned 
meeting between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama. 
Despite these caveats, the issue of bilateral disputes in EU–Russian relations indeed merits 
closer attention for several reasons. First, the EU’s approach towards Russia remains one of the 
most divisive matters in EU foreign policy and the appropriate handling of bilateral disputes has 
recently been a key element of these disagreements. Although the notion of ‘EU solidarity’ in 
bilateral disputes has gained greater visibility, its practical implications remain deeply 
contested. 
Second, Moscow’s strategic use of bilateral disputes poses a particular challenge for the EU. 
While it is not suggested that the Kremlin artificially fans every dispute as part of a grand 
‘divide and rule’ strategy, Moscow has exploited existing disagreements in various ways. For 
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example, Russia has continuously used Estonia’s and Latvia’s citizenship policies to expose 
alleged double standards in the EU’s human rights policy and deflect criticism from its own 
human rights record. In combination with bilateral energy deals, Moscow has skilfully 
employed specific bilateral disputes to weaken EU unity and isolate governments perceived as 
exerting an unfavourable influence on EU foreign policy. 
Finally, Moscow’s absence from major international legal frameworks like the WTO and the 
Energy Charter Treaty significantly reduces the chances for a law-based settlement of arising 
disputes. The lack of legal regimes guaranteeing transparency and non-discrimination in crucial 
sectors of the economy also renders the emergence of disputes more likely in the first place. In 
recent years, Moscow has not only declined to enter new regimes on Western terms, but has 
actively sought to renegotiate critical elements of the post-cold war settlement, such as the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. As the promotion of binding governance 
frameworks is a central pillar of EU foreign policy, Russia’s drive to renegotiate contracts 
perceived as disadvantageous, for example in the context of the Sakhalin-2 project, is of 
particular concern for the EU. 
Irrespective of signs of a certain rapprochement in EU–Russian relations, these challenges are 
likely to persist. Over the past years, the bilateral policies of member state governments towards 
Russia have attracted considerable attention.
1 In contrast, there are to date few studies 
examining the dynamics of specific disputes in greater detail. This paper employs a case-study 
approach to provide an in-depth analysis of selected disputes and review several questions of 
importance for EU coherence amid bilateral disputes: What kinds of issues are at the centre of 
bilateral disputes? What strategies do member state governments adopt to resolve them? Under 
what circumstances are disputes raised to the EU level? What measures does the EU take to 
tackle a dispute? Is a consensus emerging on the scope of EU solidarity? 
The selected cases  include the Polish agricultural row, the Estonian monument crisis, the 
Lufthansa Cargo dispute and the Litvinenko affair. This selection comprises some of the most 
controversial cases of recent years, while also including a mix of large and small, as well as old 
and new member states. The case studies draw on numerous interviews with EU and member 
state officials conducted in Brussels and other European capitals in the course of 2008. All case 
studies begin with a description of the political context and the substance of the dispute. Next, 
each case study analyses the approach taken by the government concerned, the measures 
implemented at the EU level and the degree of EU unity over the issue. Before embarking on 
the case studies, the next two sections draw a distinction among various types of disputes in 
relation to Community competence and provide a brief overview of predominantly economic 
and predominantly political disputes. The final part of this document draws the findings together 
for horizontal conclusions. 
2.  Community competence and EU solidarity in bilateral disputes 
Given the advanced stage of the European integration process, one can legitimately question 
whether any dispute between a member state and a third country can still be considered 
‘bilateral’. Notwithstanding the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, European foreign policy 
continues to consist of three interconnected, yet separate strands, namely the Community’s 
external relations, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the national foreign 
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policies of the member states. Hence, a distinction among various disputes needs to be drawn on 
the basis of the formal division of competences between the member states and the Community. 
In common parlance, the term ‘bilateral dispute’ refers to disagreements falling squarely within 
member state competence. Classic examples are unresolved territorial claims or espionage 
scandals. Despite their strictly bilateral character, these issues can attract close EU attention 
because of their impact on EU policies. For example, the EU’s interest in the legal certainty of 
its eastern perimeter has prompted it to identify the proper demarcation of the Russian–Baltic 
borders as one of the ‘key outstanding issues’ in EU–Russian relations. At the other end of the 
spectrum are disputes falling within exclusive Community competence. These disputes are by 
definition not bilateral matters, yet they can have a profound bilateral dimension because of 
their disproportionate impact on a specific country. For example, Moscow’s plans to increase 
the export duties on Russian timber primarily affect the Finnish and Swedish wood-processing 
industries, even if the issue is formally handled by the European Commission. Finally, 
numerous disputes do not fall neatly into either category. In practice, the specific scope of 
Community competence and the measures at its disposal are often uncertain and depend on the 
individual case. 
Although the cited examples demonstrate that this distinction is becoming increasingly blurred, 
the formal division of competences still has far-reaching implications for the handling of 
bilateral disputes. If exclusive Community competences are concerned, there is no debate on 
whether a dispute should be lifted to the EU level. The European Commission has duly taken up 
disputes falling into this category, for example, the timber export duties or the discriminatory 
railway tariffs affecting the Baltic States, which play an important role in Russia’s WTO 
negotiations. Certainly, this does not imply the absence of frictions. If only small trade volumes 
and few member states are concerned, other EU actors can be unwilling to confront Moscow 
over the issue. Also, regardless of the EU’s status as Russia’s largest trading partner, there is no 
guarantee that Moscow will yield to EU demands, which can create the impression that the 
European Commission is not putting its full weight behind the issue. 
Nevertheless, disputes falling within exclusive Community competence are generally less 
controversial. Therefore, this paper primarily examines disputes in the other two categories. If a 
genuinely bilateral dispute concerns only a single country, the affected government essentially 
has to rely on the solidarity of its counterparts to receive EU support. In general, the solidarity 
principle occupies a prominent place in many EU policies ranging from regional development 
and social cohesion to civil protection. It rests on a sense of mutual support among EU member 
states and the practice of extending assistance to a member state facing significant difficulties. 
The promotion of solidarity among the member states is an explicit objective of the Community 
(Art. 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community), which finds its manifestation in 
instruments like the structural funds or the EU solidarity fund. The Lisbon Treaty will further 
introduce a solidarity clause in cases of terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters. In 
the context of the current financial and economic crisis, EU solidarity has become the buzzword 
of many European policy debates. 
In the area of EU foreign policy, however, the principle of EU solidarity is currently less 
developed. The respective wording of the CFSP clauses in Art. 11.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union is too vague to establish a firm legal obligation. In practice, EU solidarity therefore 
frequently suffers from a collective action problem. All member states in principle wish to be 
able to mobilise EU support in a bilateral dispute. At the same time, their own readiness to 
extend solidarity in a specific case might be affected by other interests, for example the wish to 
avoid damaging their business interests in Russia. Historical examples such as the Perejil/Leila 
and the Falklands/Malvinas crises illustrate that even in disputes concerning the territorial 
integrity of a member state, the invocation of EU solidarity has often faced considerable 4 | MATHIAS ROTH 
 
obstacles. If the damage to national interests is relatively minor or other considerations are at 
stake, other member state governments might contest the call for support.
2 In addition, the 
Union appears to expect certain patterns of conduct from the member state invoking solidarity. 
This suggests that EU solidarity is not unidirectional, but also places significant requirements on 
the party requesting support.
3 The following case studies explore in greater detail the factors 
that influenced the dynamics of EU solidarity in practice. Before embarking on the first case, 
the next section places the cases into context by providing a non-exhaustive overview of various 
disputes in the economic and political spheres. 
3.  An overview of different disputes 
Even though there are strong grounds for judging individual cases on their specific merits, the 
present section places the case studies into context by grouping bilateral disputes into mainly 
economic and mainly political cases. Any such categorisation faces considerable constraints, as 
the close relationship between Russian business and politics makes it inherently difficult to 
disentangle economic from political actors. Political and economic motives also frequently 
overlap and various disputes can consequently be attributed to more than one group. For 
example, Russia’s discriminatory tariffs on international railway freight not only promote the 
economic development of its own maritime export terminals, they also reduce Russia’s 
dependence on the Baltic States by lowering reliance on the Baltic export capacities. 
3.1  Disputes falling predominantly into the economic sphere 
Notwithstanding these limitations, one can identify a first group comprising what are essentially 
commercial disputes. These conflicts are primarily driven by business actors seeking to 
maximise profits and display limited indications of a hidden political agenda. For example, 
Lukoil’s repeated reductions of crude oil supplies to German refineries in 2007–08 were caused 
by pricing disagreements and Lukoil’s ambition to circumvent the general importer Sunimex. 
Likewise, the protracted TNK-BP shareholder dispute of 2008 was essentially a boardroom 
struggle over the running of the joint venture between BP and its Russian business partners, 
even if the Russian side employed considerable administrative pressure. 
Another set of disputes over Russian import restrictions appears to stem from fundamentally 
technical problems. While Moscow undeniably manipulates technical standards in certain cases, 
Russian concerns over issues such as public health cannot a priori be dismissed as groundless. 
In particular, EU agricultural exports are not beyond reproach in each case.
4 The number of 
Russian restrictions (6) listed in the EU’s non-exhaustive Sanitary and Phytosanitary Export 
Database does not stand out against the number of restrictions imposed by other large 
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sources of foreign policy: West European reactions to the Falklands conflict, Oxford: Berg Publishers, 
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economies such as Canada (4), China (6), India (6), Japan (13) or the US (7).
5 In view of the 
huge overall trade volume between the EU and Russia, which in 2007 ranked as the EU’s third-
largest trading partner with EU imports from Russia totalling €143.88 billion and EU exports of 
€89.1 billion, the number and volume of trade-related disputes are not deemed extraordinary by 
European trade officials. 
Given the long-standing objective of diversifying Russia’s economy and modernising its 
decaying infrastructure, Russian industrial policy is the key driver behind another set of 
disputes. For example, President Vladimir Putin publicly admitted that the timber export duties 
aim at developing Russia’s wood-processing industry, namely by forcing Finnish companies to 
move their wood processing plants to Russia.
6 Similar measures include the increased car 
import duties introduced in early 2009, the forced relocation of Lufthansa Cargo’s Asian transit 
hub to Krasnoyarsk and the Siberian overflight payments, which in effect constitute a subsidy to 
Aeroflot. In several of these cases, Moscow exploits its status of being outside the WTO 
framework to pursue protectionist policies running counter to WTO principles and the EU–
Russian bilateral market-access agreement of May 2004. 
As reflected by the increasing state control over Russia’s strategic industries, the Russian energy 
sector straddles the boundary between the economic and the political spheres. Since energy 
exports are of crucial importance for the Russian budget and one of Moscow’s primary sources 
of power, Russian energy policy seeks to maximise both economic and political gains. Although 
these objectives frequently overlap, for instance in the case of Gazprom’s acquisition of 
profitable and strategic downstream assets, political considerations can take precedence in other 
cases. For example, expensive, offshore infrastructure projects (like the South Stream gas 
pipeline or the Baltic Pipeline System 2) mainly serve the political objective of circumventing 
traditional transit states such as Ukraine or Belarus. In 2007-08, the dispute over the Lithuanian 
Mazeikiu refinery was of particular relevance for EU-Russian relations. After the Polish energy 
company PKN Orlen had acquired a majority stake in the refinery at the expense of Russian 
competitors, Transneft cut crude oil supplies delivered through the Druzhba pipeline in July 
2006. As Transneft stonewalled Lithuania’s requests for resuming supplies, Vilnius eventually 
took the step of formally blocking the EU–Russia negotiating directives in early 2008 to 
leverage EU pressure for reopening the pipeline. Further energy disputes displaying a mix of 
economic and political objectives include the struggle over the Sakhalin-2 project in 2006 and 
Transneft’s supply cut against the Latvian Ventspils oil terminal in 2003. 
In terms of the member states concerned, Russia’s neighbours are undeniably more frequently 
affected by certain disputes owing to their specific geography, historical ties and infrastructure 
connections. Examples here include the timber export duties or the discriminatory railway 
tariffs. Despite the drastic diversification of export markets in the 1990s, several industries in 
the new member states also remain highly dependent on the Russian market. Recent Russian 
import restrictions against Latvia’s two largest sprats producers decreased Latvian canned fish 
exports by 25% in 2007 alone.
7 In the energy sector, most intentional supply cuts have likewise 
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Commission, Brussels, 2009 (retrieved from http://mkaccdb.eu.int/madb_barriers/indexPubli_sps.htm, 
accessed 5 March). 
6 Russian Federation, Transcript of the Annual Big Press Conference by President V.V. Putin, Russian 
Presidential Administration, Moscow, 14 February 2008. 
7 See the newsru.com article, “Двухлетняя шпротная “война” между Россией и Латвией закончится 1 
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targeted the Baltic States and other former Soviet Republics.
8 As the January 2009 gas crisis 
illustrated, the inherited import dependence on a single supplier and transit state, combined with 
low gas-storage capacities and the absence of LNG facilities, renders many new member states 
highly vulnerable to supply disruptions. 
Nevertheless, the differences between Russia’s neighbours and other EU member states should 
not be overstated. Given Russia’s pre-crisis status as Europe’s largest consumer market in 
several areas, a number of Western industries have become dependent on market access. In 
2008, for example, Russian restrictions on British pelagic fish deprived several Scottish 
processors of their largest export destination. Furthermore, the major disputes over energy 
investments in Russia such as Sakhalin-2, the Kovykta field and TNK-BP concerned old 
member states like the UK or the Netherlands. Trade officials opine that notwithstanding several 
politically motivated cases discussed below, there is only limited evidence that Russia 
systematically singles out certain member states in trade disputes. Regarding sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) disputes, no official EU or Russian database suggests that Moscow is 
targeting a specific country on a large scale.
9 Indeed, even governments engaged in fierce 
political disputes have enjoyed flourishing business relations with Russia. Polish overall exports 
to Russia registered high growth rates throughout the agricultural row and rose by 18.4% in 
2006 alone.
10 Conversely, import bans imposed on technical or protectionist grounds, such as 
the restrictions introduced in early 2008 over antibiotics residues in certain meat products, have 
not excluded member states enjoying close relations with Russia. While the number of disputes 
has undeniably risen since enlargement, this increase is not disproportionate given the specific 
trading patterns of the new member states. 
3.2  Disputes falling predominantly into the political and historical 
spheres 
In contrast to the preceding examples, many disputes mainly fall into the political sphere. The 
underlying causes are often highly idiosyncratic, yet a categorisation according to issue areas 
can help to identify certain patterns. 
In several cases, Russian economic restrictions are clearly politically motivated and aim at 
influencing political decisions or penalising governments defying the Kremlin. The restrictions 
imposed on Estonia after the monument crisis evidently served as retribution for the 
monument’s removal. As a substantial share of Estonian export terminals are owned by Russian 
companies, the restrictions actually hurt Russian business interests. The characteristics of the 
Polish agricultural ban also pointed to political underpinnings; even so, Moscow’s open use of 
economic sanctions has largely been confined to the Baltic States and other post-Soviet 
countries like Georgia.
11 Elsewhere, politically motivated sanctions have occasionally drawn on 
semi-official measures with only limited effectiveness. During the Chechen World Congress in 
2002, for example, the United Russia Party issued a boycott call against Danish goods. 
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10 A. Eberhardt, “Relations between Poland and Russia”, in R. Kuzniar (ed.), Yearbook of Polish Foreign 
Policy, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, 2007, p. 136. 
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Disputes over asylum and extradition decisions frequently stem from a clash between Moscow’s 
wish to prosecute individuals deemed hostile to the government and European doubts about the 
independence of the Russian judiciary. Under this heading are the British–Russian rows over 
political émigrés like Boris Berezovsky or Denmark’s refusal to extradite Akhmed Zakayev in 
2002. Spain and Greece also rejected extraditing media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky in 2000–01 
and 2003, respectively. Similar rule of law considerations motivated London’s insistence on 
trying Andrey Lugovoy in the UK and Denmark’s refusal to cancel the Chechen World 
Congress. These decisions are frequently taken by independent European judicial bodies, but 
Russian pressure or ministerial interventions on the EU side can strongly politicise these cases.
12 
Violations of diplomatic privileges have usually occurred as part of broader political conflicts. 
For example, a harassment campaign by the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi against the British 
ambassador to Russia, Tony Brenton, was triggered by his speech at the “Other Russia” 
opposition conference in July 2006 against the background of growing British criticism of 
Russia’s authoritarian development. The failure to adequately protect the Estonian embassy in 
Moscow was motivated by the monument crisis. Although an attack on Polish embassy staff by 
unknown assailants in summer 2005 appeared to be in-kind retribution for the beatings of 
Russian diplomats’ children by Warsaw hooligans, it also occurred in the context of tense 
Polish–Russian relations. 
Even before Russia’s resumption of strategic bomber flights in August 2007, airspace violations 
by Russian military aircraft travelling to Kaliningrad have repeatedly affected Finland and the 
Baltic States. In September 2005, the crash of a Russian fighter jet on Lithuanian territory 
caused considerable frictions in spite of a Russian apology and compensation pledge. While 
both sides at first cooperated professionally, Moscow exerted considerable pressure to protest 
against Lithuania’s insistence on a full investigation before the release of the pilot and the 
remains of the aircraft. 
Moscow’s increasingly critical stance towards independent media has also led to restrictions on 
the work of official European cultural agents. EU broadcasters had already been affected by 
temporary licensing disputes, but the Litvinenko case reportedly motivated the forced removal 
of the BBC’s Russian Service from two local FM partner stations in November 2006 and the 
Bolshoye Radio joint venture in August 2007, which permanently left the Russian Service 
without FM broadcasting.
13 Likewise, foreign minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly labelled the 
forced closure of two regional British Council offices in early 2008 retribution for London’s 
measures in the Litvinenko affair. 
The majority of historical disputes between the member states and Russia are rooted in 
diverging interpretations of the former USSR’s role in World War II. This concerns, for 
example, Russia’s refusal of access to the Katyn investigation files, Lithuania’s ban on the 
public display of Soviet and Nazi symbols and the Estonian monument crisis. Irrespective of 
their seemingly symbolic subject matter, several historiographical disputes have considerable 
practical implications. For instance, the dispute over the annexation of the Baltic States is the 
primary reason for the absence of an Estonian–Russian border agreement. Historical issues also 
play a minor role in Russia’s relations with its former WWII adversaries. Prominent examples 
include the dispute over German cultural property transferred to the USSR after WWII, which 
in the 1990s caused considerable political infighting in Russia, and the legal attempts of Finnish 
civil society organisations to reclaim private properties in certain parts of Karelia. 
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The idiosyncratic nature of many political and historical disputes makes it difficult to identify 
the member states affected beyond a few broad generalisations. As the examples show, political 
disputes are not confined to the small and new member states – they also affect old and large 
member states like the UK or Spain. In most cases, serious disputes have occurred against the 
backdrop of pre-existing political tensions, which suggests a mutually reinforcing dynamic 
between specific bilateral disputes and the broader political context. Yet, the overview indicates 
that political disputes can also suddenly affect countries like Denmark or Spain, which 
otherwise entertain constructive ties with Moscow. In the case of historical disputes, the Baltic 
States are most frequently affected owing to the disproportionately higher number of open 
issues and the domestic sensitivity of relations with Russia. In this respect, Moscow’s selective 
engagement with Central Europe also contributes to a certain differentiation among the new 
member states. For example, even though Moscow retains an unbending stance on the Baltic 
annexation, President Putin made conciliatory gestures towards Budapest and Prague in spring 
2006 by acknowledging Russia’s moral responsibility for the suppression of the Hungarian 
uprising in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
Along with showing that bilateral disputes with Russia are not limited to a particular group of 
member states, these examples suggest the existence of several important differences, including 
regarding the handling of specific disputes. These differences are examined below through four 
in-depth case studies. The analysis begins with the Polish case, which not only witnessed the 
most extensive EU involvement, but was also the first time that the call for ‘solidarity’ in EU–
Russian relations was vigorously made. 
4.  The Russian import ban on Polish agricultural products 
4.1  Political context of the case 
In recent years, Polish–Russian relations have been severely strained by numerous political 
disagreements. Warsaw’s advocacy of further NATO and EU enlargement has clashed with 
Moscow’s claims to a sphere of influence in the former USSR. In the energy sphere, Gazprom’s 
downstream expansion and offshore transit strategy have triggered opposition from Warsaw, 
whereas Polish plans for hosting the US missile defence shield have provoked angry reactions 
from Moscow. Besides an ongoing dispute over navigation in the Vistula/Kaliningrad lagoon – 
which centres on Russian access restrictions for third-country vessels passing through the Strait 
of Baltiysk – the two sides have also been engaged in several protracted historical rows. Two 
important cases concern Russia’s denial of access to the Katyn investigation files and the 
restitution of Polish cultural property transferred to the USSR in the wake of WWII. The 
agricultural import ban had been preceded by a particularly tense period in 2005, which saw 
quarrels over historical anniversaries relating to WWII, several symbolic disputes and the 
planned Nord Stream pipeline. 
4.2  The substance and background of the dispute 
On 10 November 2005, the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary 
Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) banned a wide range of meat imports from Poland, which was 
supplemented by a ban on plant products on 14 November.
14 Rosselkhoznadzor’s justification 
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for the restrictions was vague and changed repeatedly. Initially, Moscow claimed that certain 
meat products that were not suitable for human consumption had been exported to Russia from 
third countries with counterfeit Polish certificates. Next, the Russian authorities asserted that 
several Polish meat shipments had violated Russian veterinary regulations or had been 
accompanied by falsified veterinary export certificates. Russia made similar accusations 
regarding counterfeit phytosanitary certificates and inadmissible pesticide residues in Polish 
plant products. As Warsaw took corrective measures, Russia criticised the principles of intra-
Community transit more broadly and even demanded that Poland certify all EU agricultural 
exports transiting Poland en route to Russia as complying with Russian legislation. 
Veterinary and phytosanitary certification had earlier caused frictions with Russia, which to a 
certain extent had been linked to the division of competences within the EU. The European 
Commission is the main player regarding SPS imports, but problems concerning SPS exports 
have traditionally been handled by the member states. In June 2004, Moscow briefly blocked 
meat imports from the entire EU to push for a single EU export certificate. Lacking a 
comprehensive veterinary and phytosanitary agreement, Moscow and Brussels have resolved 
arising disputes in an ad hoc fashion, in particular by signing memoranda on harmonised 
veterinary and phytosanitary certificates in 2004–05. 
The Polish authorities acknowledged certain shortcomings and took corrective measures by 
improving safeguards against document falsification, tightening quality controls and 
strengthening the role of the Polish customs service in meat export controls. Simultaneously, 
Warsaw insisted that the ban was disproportionate to the reported irregularities and highly 
discriminatory, as several problems also concerned other member states. Since the ban’s 
imposition had coincided with a parliamentary confidence vote in the new government of the 
Law and Justice Party, numerous officials regarded the restrictions as politically motivated. 
4.3  The Polish government’s approach to the dispute 
Despite the political overtones, Warsaw initially treated the ban as a technical issue. Polish 
foreign minister Stefan Meller sought to avoid an escalation and arranged for bilateral expert 
consultations between the respective veterinary and customs services. The government informed 
its EU counterparts,
15 yet only requested discreet European Commission involvement and did 
not push the issue onto the agenda of the Council’s 133 Committee on external trade policy or 
the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST). 
By early 2006, the Polish veterinary and phytosanitary services had held several meetings with 
their Russian counterparts. In February 2006, the visit of Russian presidential envoy Sergey 
Yastrzhembsky briefly raised hopes for a thaw in bilateral relations, but produced no agreement 
on narrowing the ban. As Rosselkhoznadzor stonewalled, Warsaw raised the issue onto a higher 
level by requesting a meeting between the agriculture ministers and dispatching a letter from the 
prime minister, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, to which there was no reply. When a ministerial 
meeting finally took place on 30-31 March, it only produced further Russian requests for 
information.
16 
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As the bilateral talks yielded no result, Warsaw progressively sought stronger EU support. In 
spring 2006, the Polish ministry of the economy began to consider the ban as a market access 
issue, pushed for greater involvement of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade and 
formally enquired about the possibility of using the dispute-settlement mechanism of the EU–
Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. When the European Commission tabled the 
draft negotiating directives for the new EU–Russia agreement in July 2006, Warsaw reiterated 
its request for stronger support, but initially made no linkage between the ban and the directives. 
As their adoption drew closer, Polish officials increasingly felt that Brussels addressed the ban 
without genuine commitment and resented that it continued being treated as a bilateral problem. 
The dispute had also become more politicised with the July 2006 assumption of the prime 
ministerial office by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who placed great emphasis on defending traditionally-
understood Polish national interests. By mid-October, Poland had openly linked the ban with the 
EU–Russia negotiations and formally blocked the directives at the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council of 13 November 2006 amid calls for EU solidarity. 
After the veto, the dispute became highly politicised and Warsaw took an uncompromising 
stance towards both Russia and the EU. Kaczynski rejected the idea of making concessions, 
stylised the issue as a trial of strength and appeared to limit dialogue with Moscow. In 
September 2007, Poland further increased its counter-pressure by blocking a preliminary stage 
of Moscow’s OECD accession talks and by threatening to block Russia’s WTO accession. 
4.4 EU  involvement 
On the EU side, the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers and the European 
Commission’s Moscow delegation had been involved early on. After initially being confined to 
a support role, the Commission began taking the lead in the technical consultations as of early 
2006. Various council bodies also dealt with the issue and an ad hoc group on anti-fraud 
measures for export certificates was created. Both prior to and after the veto, the EU’s Food and 
Veterinary Office conducted several inspection rounds in Poland. Brussels supported Poland’s 
view that the ban was disproportionate and discriminatory. On 22 May 2006, EU commissioner 
for health and consumer protection, Markos Kyprianou, reiterated that Poland “had taken all 
necessary steps to meet the Russian technical requirements” and noted that he was closely 
liaising with Peter Mandelson, then European commissioner for trade, to address what “had 
clearly become a trade issue”.
17 Mandelson and his officials did indeed raise the ban at several 
EU–Russia meetings. Still, Warsaw regarded EU support as lukewarm and complained that 
some officials apparently dismissed the ban as a historically charged row between Poland and 
its former colonial overlord. 
Most governments were exasperated by the Polish veto, but the move nonetheless triggered 
renewed efforts to resolve the dispute. As Brussels dispatched fresh inspection missions, the 
Finnish Council presidency pressured Warsaw to accept a compromise before the EU–Russia 
summit of 23 November 2006. In spite of assurances of strong EU support for lifting the ban, 
Warsaw rejected all proposals and insisted on the ability to interrupt the EU-Russia negotiations 
anytime. 
In January 2007, the problem was inherited by the German presidency, which sought to resolve 
the dispute by expanding high-level contacts with Russia. Meanwhile, the European 
                                                                                                                                                            
on selected activities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in the period from 
31.10.2005 to 24.04.2006], Warsaw, 21 April 2006. 
17 Council of the European Union, 2730
th Council Meeting – Agriculture and Fisheries, Council 
Document 9170/06, Press release 132, Brussels, 22 May 2006. BILATERAL DISPUTES BETWEEN EU MEMBER STATES AND RUSSIA | 11 
 
Commission arranged the first rounds of ‘joint’ inspections by Russian and Commission 
veterinary services in Poland. Berlin tried hard to negotiate an agreement, but a key EU–Russia 
meeting on 21-22 April failed to produce the desired breakthrough and mutual relations instead 
plummeted to new lows with the Estonian monument crisis. The failure to reach a deal with 
Russia prompted Berlin to take a strong position at the Samara summit of 17-18 May 2007, 
during which Chancellor Angela Merkel repeatedly raised the ban. During the press conference, 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso explicitly stated that “a Polish problem is a 
European problem”, as the EU was “based on principles of solidarity”.
18 The summit was hailed 
as a great success by Poland and came as a genuine surprise to Moscow, which had not expected 
a robust show of EU support for a government regarded as an awkward partner. 
With a resolution still pending, the Portuguese presidency decreased attention to the dispute and 
focused EU–Russian cooperation on practical issues like tackling border congestion. The 
breakthrough only came with the Polish pre-term elections of October 2007. As the incoming 
prime minister, Donald Tusk, had made the improvement of relations with Russia and the EU a 
priority, Poland sought to re-establish dialogue, toned down the political rhetoric and made a 
conciliatory gesture by unblocking Russia’s OECD talks. On the Russian side, the elections 
allowed Moscow to blame the Kaczynski government for the dispute and proceed towards the 
negotiations of the new EU–Russia agreement. As the EU had refused to be split by Russia over 
the dispute despite the irritation at Poland’s intransigence, the ban had also exhausted its 
political usefulness for Moscow. 
After fresh inspections of Polish meat plants and a visit by foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski 
to Moscow, the meat ban and the restrictions on Polish plant products not for human 
consumption were lifted in December 2007 and January 2008, respectively. The remaining 
restrictions were lifted in March 2008 after the negotiation of an EU–Russia memorandum on 
the safety of plant products for human consumption. Rosselkhoznadzor had continually raised 
new technical problems over the previous years, some of which had been deemed legitimate by 
EU officials; still, the rapid lifting of the ban confirmed that the resolution had largely depended 
on the political will of both Moscow and Warsaw. 
4.5  Assessing EU unity and support 
As Moscow stonewalled in spite of Poland’s efforts to address the irregularities, most European 
officials initially regarded Warsaw’s request for support as legitimate. Poland also cooperated 
well with the European Commission on a technical level. In contrast, no member state except 
Lithuania openly condoned Poland’s attempt to ‘force’ stronger support. Poland complained 
about being treated as a second-class member of the EU. EU officials, however, denied that 
Brussels was not putting its full weight behind the issue. To a certain extent, these differences 
stemmed from legal uncertainties over the nature of Community competence for SPS exports, 
which were only clarified after the Polish veto. Apart from the Polish case, the competence 
issue was also raised by a Russian threat to ban meat imports from the entire EU as of January 
2007 because of swine fever in Bulgaria and Romania. Moscow demanded signing bilateral 
agreements with individual member states to continue exports, while the Commission insisted 
that the issue concerned Community competence. As the member states refused to sign bilateral 
deals, Moscow eventually gave in and reached agreement with the EU to avert the ban. 
Following a discussion in the Council’s Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER II) 
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on 20 December 2006, an ad hoc working party was established to clarify the competence issue 
exhaustively, which presented its conclusions in spring 2007.
19 
Notwithstanding the legal issues, most officials strongly disapproved of Poland’s veto for 
several reasons. First, the import ban was widely regarded as a largely symbolic dispute. 
Although the restrictions officially affected 45% of Polish agricultural exports to Russia, many 
producers soon switched to alternative markets or channelled their exports to Russia through 
other countries. Compared with Warsaw’s early calculation of the value of the restrictions at 
$225 million, later estimates put the actual losses incurred in 2006 at a fraction of this amount.
20 
Second, most officials rejected taking an openly confrontational approach towards Moscow and 
deemed it unlikely that Russia could be forced into an open climb-down in a politically charged 
dispute. Hence, the veto was considered counterproductive, as it undermined the EU’s ability to 
settle the dispute in the context of the EU–Russia negotiations. Third, most governments greatly 
disapproved of Poland’s uncompromising stance after the imposition of the veto, which created 
the impression that it only invoked solidarity for itself. Many officials concluded that Kaczynski 
was more interested in shoring up domestic support and asserting Poland’s position in Europe 
than in genuinely solving the dispute.
21 
Consequently, the EU had severe difficulties in upholding a united position. Whereas at first the 
EU provided reasonable support, the veto decreased EU coherence, exposed sharp internal 
divisions and led to an embarrassing EU–Russia summit in November 2006. The growing 
deterioration of EU–Russian relations in 2007 facilitated a certain convergence, yet the show of 
support at Samara masked considerable divisions. Even as the member states recognised that the 
Union could not allow itself to be split over the dispute and Germany also sought to mollify 
Poland for the upcoming reform treaty negotiations, many officials deemed it illegitimate to 
hold EU–Russian relations hostage to a largely symbolic, highly politicised dispute. 
5.  The Estonian monument crisis 
5.1  Political context of the case 
Estonian–Russian relations have been continually strained by fundamental disagreements over 
the Soviet role in WWII. While Tallinn holds that Estonia was forcibly annexed to the USSR in 
1940, Moscow insists that the Baltic Republics joined voluntarily. After restoring its 
independence, Estonia adopted a relatively restrictive citizenship policy, which was heavily 
criticised by Moscow for not automatically granting citizenship to the Soviet migrants settling 
in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic after 1940. A border treaty signed in May 2005 was 
not ratified by Russia, when the Estonian parliament added references to the restoration of 
statehood and the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 to the preamble of the ratification law. Given that 
the USSR’s role as Europe’s liberator from fascism serves an important symbolic function in 
Russia, the Kremlin perceives Estonia’s portrayal of the USSR as an aggressive occupant as 
directly undermining its legitimacy. 
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5.2  The substance and background of the dispute 
Erected in 1947, the Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn (Bronze Soldier) originally 
occupied a square in central Tallinn and contained a small Soviet war grave. Whereas many 
Estonians came to regard the monument as a symbol of Soviet repression, it represented 
wartime sacrifice to many Red Army veterans. During Victory Day commemorations on 9 May 
2006, a serious clash between pro-Soviet demonstrators and Estonian nationalists occurred at 
the site. This prompted the prime minister, Andrus Ansip, to argue for relocating the monument, 
which in his view had become a site of confrontation exacerbating societal divisions. In January 
2007, the Estonian parliament passed the War Graves Protection Act to create a legal basis for 
relocating the monument and circumventing opposition from Tallinn’s city council and its 
mayor, Edgar Savisaar.
22 During the parliamentary elections of March 2007, Ansip’s vigorous 
stance on the issue allowed him to capture a large share of the nationalist vote. Besides parts of 
Estonia’s Russian-speaking community, the planned relocation evoked fierce protests from 
Russian politicians, who levelled vociferous accusations of glorifying fascism at Estonia. On 23 
April 2007, the Russian foreign ministry issued an official protest, warning of “most serious 
consequences for relations between Russia and Estonia”.
23 
The crisis started on 26 April, when excavation preparations at the site sparked a series of 
demonstrations and violent riots. Following a government emergency meeting, the Bronze 
Soldier was removed in the early hours of 27 April. Before the situation calmed down on 28 
April, two nights of rioting and looting in central Tallinn had left over 1,000 persons detained, 
more than 150 injured and 1 dead. The riots were accompanied by highly inflammatory rhetoric 
in the Russian government-controlled media and pressure from Russian officials, who 
condemned Estonia’s actions as ‘barbarism’ or ‘blasphemy’. On 27 April, the Russian 
Federation Council passed a resolution calling for a stern response including the possible 
termination of diplomatic relations. As of 27 April, the websites of Estonian state institutions 
and service providers also experienced large-scale cyber attacks, with ever more sophistication. 
Most international attention focused on the weeklong blockade of the Estonian embassy in 
Moscow by the youth movements Nashi and Molodaya Gvardiya. In violation of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Russian police forces did not stop the picketers from 
tearing down the Estonian flag, restricting the movement of embassy staff or blocking access to 
visitors. On 2 May, the bodyguards of Estonia’s ambassador Marina Kaljurand had to use tear 
gas against activists, who violently disrupted a press conference held at the Moscow office of 
the newspaper Argumenty i fakty. Finally, Estonia faced economic pressure referred to as 
‘hidden sanctions’. Apart from boycott calls against Estonian products by Russian officials, 
Estonian sales contracts were abruptly cancelled and planned Russian investments suspended. 
On 2 May 2007, truck traffic at the main bridge into Estonia was blocked and the Russian 
railways halted deliveries of oil, petroleum products and coal. Most measures proved temporary, 
but the crisis accelerated the decline of Russian transit trade, which cut Estonian GDP growth 
for 2007 by up to 1.5%.
24 
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Moscow denied imposing any sanctions, even as Estonian foreign minister Urmas Paet openly 
accused Russia of “coordinated activities undertaken against Estonia”.
25 Paet claimed that the 
cyber attacks originated from servers within Russian government agencies and accused Russian 
embassy staff of instigating the Tallinn riots. Estonia emphasised that despite Moscow’s 
rhetoric about the ‘blasphemous’ removal of the ‘sacred’ monument, similar monuments had 
routinely been relocated in Russia itself, and suggested that Moscow’s fierce reaction aimed at 
instilling a siege mentality among the Russian population in view of the upcoming political 
transition. 
5.3  The Estonian government’s approach to the dispute 
Initially, Estonia firmly treated the dispute as bilateral and hoped to allay concerns by carrying 
out the relocation in a legally correct manner. Tallinn briefed other member state governments 
about its plans, but did not display the intention of gaining EU-level leverage. Estonia only 
requested EU support after the eruption of the crisis. Even then, the government argued that the 
relocation and the riots were internal matters, whereas the retaliatory measures concerned the 
entire EU. During the events, Estonia was mostly pre-occupied with seeking to contain the 
crisis. Upon the initiative of the Council presidency, the government invited a State Duma 
delegation to Estonia to open a channel of communication. This step failed to defuse the 
tensions, as the delegation publicly called for the government’s resignation and the return of the 
monument. Foreign Minister Paet also issued several notes to protest against the failure to 
adequately protect the Estonian embassy and on 2 May telephoned his Russian counterpart to 
urge increased security measures. 
As the situation deteriorated, Paet issued a dramatic declaration stating that “the European 
Union is under attack, as Russia is attacking Estonia”.
26 He opined that the EU reaction should 
be “as vigorous as possible” and suggested that the EU–Russia negotiations should not start or 
the upcoming Samara summit should be postponed. Prime Minister Ansip also called for an 
adequate EU response, but Tallinn soon toned down its rhetoric and never seriously threatened 
to join Poland’s veto. The government hoped that a strong display of EU solidarity would end 
the crisis; however, Tallinn continued to be restrained in its requests for specific assistance. 
5.4 EU  involvement 
International involvement was very limited before the escalation. With the eruption of the crisis, 
individual member state governments, NATO and Washington issued declarations of support. 
EU High Representative Javier Solana engaged in telephone diplomacy and the European 
Commission cooperated through its Moscow delegation and called upon Russian companies to 
honour their contracts with Estonia. As Brussels had limited legal leverage to address the 
‘hidden sanctions’, Tallinn refrained from pushing for substantial EU action over this issue. 
The most comprehensive EU involvement came through the mediation attempts of the German 
Council presidency. Following two nights of riots, Chancellor Merkel held telephone 
conversations with Putin and Ansip to urge restraint and encourage direct Estonian–Russian 
contacts. Even as Merkel emphasised that the relocation was a “sovereign decision of the 
Estonian government”,
27 Berlin carefully avoided taking sides in the historical dispute and 
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instead focused on the measures against Estonia. When the crisis intensified with the 
deterioration of the embassy blockade, a CFSP statement issued on 2 May “strongly urge[d]” 
Russia to comply with its obligations under the Vienna Diplomatic Convention, which was 
followed up by a formal demarche and a corresponding European Commission declaration.
28 
Eventually, German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier mediated a compromise to end 
the crisis. Russia agreed to forcibly disperse the blockade, if required, under the condition that 
Ambassador Kaljurand left Moscow.
29 When Tallinn agreed and Kaljurand departed on 3 May 
2007, the youth groups claimed victory and promptly cleared the site. At the Samara summit, 
the presidency and the European Commission also raised the embassy blockade, the sanctions 
and the cyber attacks. While Commission President Barroso called for mutual dialogue over 
sensitive historical issues, he expressed the EU’s solidarity with Tallinn and asserted during the 
press conference that Estonian problems were problems for all of Europe.
  The European 
Commission further reminded Moscow of its commitment to cooperate in the fight against 
cyber crime under various legal frameworks. 
5.5  Assessing EU unity and support 
In assessing EU unity and support, a distinction can be drawn between the monument dispute 
itself and the retaliatory measures. The EU emphasised Estonia’s sovereign right to relocate the 
monument, but many officials privately questioned the wisdom of the relocation and regarded 
the dispute as somewhat bizarre. In contrast, Russia’s crude overreaction was instrumental in 
producing a reasonably high degree of unity during the crisis itself. The riots, the embassy 
blockade and the cyber attacks clearly affected important national interests. Although the 
overall degree of government involvement was uncertain, Russian officials failed to protect the 
Estonian embassy and issued inflammatory statements. Moscow ignored Estonian requests for 
protecting the embassy and Tallinn exhausted its own possibilities for addressing the crisis. 
Many governments resented that the EU was dragged into a politicised historical dispute, but 
there was a certain understanding that regardless of these reservations, the Union had no choice 
but to support a member state under fierce pressure from Moscow. Except for Paet’s dramatic 
declaration on 1 May, Estonia’s conduct during the crisis was also regarded as cooperative. As 
the government was aware of its very limited political capital, Tallinn was pleased with the level 
of EU support and careful not to be perceived as misusing EU solidarity. 
6.  The dispute over Lufthansa Cargo overflight rights 
6.1  Political context of the case 
Germany and Russia consider each other strategic partners and attach great significance to their 
close political and economic ties. Chancellor Merkel has taken a more reserved stance than her 
predecessor has, but Berlin remains a major advocate of closer EU–Russian integration.
30 
German political discourse heavily emphasises Russia’s indispensable role for preserving 
European stability and addressing common global challenges. In the economic sphere, Russia 
accounts for over 42% of German natural gas imports and is a significant export market. 
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Conversely, Germany is Russia’s largest trade partner and a major source of investment and 
technology. Nevertheless, bilateral disputes are not alien to German–Russian relations, as 
exemplified by the cultural property dispute. Yet, most disputes are of a commercial nature and 
are resolved without great controversy, as in the case of Lukoil’s repeated oil-supply reductions 
in 2007–08. 
6.2  The substance and background of the dispute 
Irrespective of the recent development of external aviation policy at the Community level and 
the Commission’s proposals for a comprehensive air-transport agreement, EU–Russian aviation 
relations remain highly fragmented. Crucial issues such as traffic rights continue to be regulated 
through bilateral air-services agreements. Aviation experts consider the German–Russian air 
services agreement to be among the most liberal and comprehensive regimes. The agreement 
has allowed Germany to gain the highest proportion of EU–Russian air traffic (with 39% of 
frequencies) and to become Russia’s biggest single international-aviation market.
31 
The dispute concerned the right of Lufthansa Cargo to transit Russian airspace en route to East 
Asia and the transport hub used for this itinerary. Before the dispute, Lufthansa Cargo, Europe’s 
largest airfreight carrier and a 100% subsidiary of the German flag-carrier Lufthansa, had been 
using a recently modernised airport in Kazakhstan near Astana as its main hub for up to 49 
flights per week to East Asian destinations. On 28 October 2007, Russia announced a de facto 
ban on these flights with the expiry of the summer flight plan. The ban compelled Lufthansa 
Cargo to circumvent Russian territory and considerably pushed up operation costs by extending 
flight duration by three hours. The Russian transport ministry claimed that the flight routes 
agreed in the German–Russian air transport agreement did not cover the itinerary via Astana, 
which had only been based on a temporary permission expiring on 27 October. Moscow further 
asserted that a German–Russian protocol signed on 23 February 2007 committed Lufthansa 
Cargo to switching its hub to Krasnoyarsk or Novosibirsk. As the German side had allegedly 
taken no steps to implement the commitment, Moscow made the extension of the temporary 
permission conditional on the relocation of the hub to a Russian airport.
32 European officials 
concluded that Moscow’s stance was motivated by the objective of developing Russia’s airport 
infrastructure and increasing its role as an international transit route. 
Initially, Berlin dismissed the claims as unfounded and stressed that the ban had come without 
advance warning. Germany insisted that an agreement on extending the existing overflight 
permission had been reached only a week earlier. Lufthansa Cargo confirmed that Russia had 
expressed an interest in hosting the hub, but the company categorically denied the existence of 
binding commitments and rejected any linkage with the overflight rights. 
6.3  The German government’s approach to the dispute 
During the first week, the ministries involved lacked a coherent approach to the dispute. 
Initially, Wolfgang Tiefensee, the German transport minister, took a robust stance. In parallel 
with initiating consultations, Tiefensee suspended Aeroflot’s landing rights for cargo flights to 
its Western European hub at Hahn airport in Rhineland-Palatinate. After Aeroflot threatened to 
move its transportation business to Luxembourg, however, local businessmen lobbied the 
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premier of Rhineland-Palatinate, Kurt Beck, who in his capacity as Tiefensee’s party leader 
successfully pushed for rescinding the measures the very next day. In contrast to Tiefensee, the 
German foreign office placed strong emphasis on avoiding further escalation and averting 
potential damage to German–Russian relations. After the first talks between the transport 
ministries yielded no result, Frank-Walter Steinmeier intervened and raised the issue during a 
telephone conversation with his Russian counterpart on 1 November. Steinmeier was reportedly 
dissatisfied with Tiefensee’s approach, but he apparently became involved only grudgingly and 
continued to stress Tiefensee’s responsibility for the matter. 
Subsequently, Tiefensee took a softer approach and stressed the need to negotiate a mutually 
satisfactory solution. After Germany declared its readiness to consider moving the transit hub to 
Krasnoyarsk, the Russian transport ministry lifted the de facto ban on 2 November 2007 and 
extended Lufthansa Cargo’s temporary overflight rights until 15 November 2007. In an apparent 
concession, Tiefensee emphasised that further negotiations would primarily focus on the 
conditions for relocating the transit hub. In particular, Germany demanded framework 
conditions comparable to those in Astana and an upgrade of Krasnoyarsk airport to International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) category II to allow for landing in difficult weather 
conditions. 
From the outset, the dispute attracted broad media attention. Both coalition and opposition 
politicians called for sending ‘a clear message’ to Moscow and taking ‘counter-measures’, for 
example by blocking Russia’s WTO accession.
33 The opposition sharply criticised Tiefensee’s 
handling of the dispute and Steinmeier’s alleged inactivity. After overcoming the initial 
coordination problems, however, the government was anxious to contain the domestic 
reverberations and play down the significance of the dispute. When Russian air traffic 
controllers denied a military supply flight for the German troop contingent in Afghanistan the 
right to cross Russian territory on 14 November 2007 – ostensibly because the flight had no 
diplomatic clearance after being re-scheduled due to bad weather – defence minister Franz Josef 
Jung vehemently denied any political background and dismissed the incident as a mere 
administrative problem. 
On 9 November, Tiefensee announced that an agreement had been reached on the continuation 
of the flights until the end of February 2008, whereas the relocation of the hub would be 
hammered out in bilateral negotiations.
34 Lufthansa Cargo had earlier appeared dissatisfied with 
Tiefensee’s weak stance and had declared that the relocation was not a foregone conclusion, but 
the airline eventually agreed to move the hub subject to an upgrade of Krasnoyarsk airport. A 
definitive solution was reached during intergovernmental negotiations in Munich on 13-14 
March 2008. Moscow further extended Lufthansa Cargo’s overflight permission and granted 
additional overflight rights for South Korean destinations. Berlin made a definitive commitment 
to relocate the hub no later than five months after Krasnoyarsk received category II certification 
from the ICAO. In a declaration of intent signed in May 2008, Krasnoyarsk airport pledged to 
undertake the required upgrades and investment. 
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6.4 EU  involvement 
As the matter did not immediately concern Community competence, Berlin was not obliged to 
involve the EU. After some hesitation, Germany firmly treated the dispute as a bilateral matter. 
Various politicians called for lifting the dispute to the EU level, but Tiefensee stated during the 
de facto ban that EU involvement would only be considered if other member states were 
experiencing similar problems or no swift solution were found.
35 The government consulted the 
European Commission and informed its EU counterparts, although it did not request that the 
issue be raised during EU–Russia meetings. Berlin opined that EU involvement would not 
provide any additional leverage, but only further politicise the dispute. Whereas the spat 
arguably exacerbated the difficult climate in EU–Russian relations in the field of aviation, it had 
no major impact on EU–Russian relations in general. The postponement of the EU–Russia 
aviation summit of 9 November 2007 resulted from Russia’s failure to sign the Siberian 
overflight agreement. Even though the dispute suggested that even Moscow’s strategic partners 
could become the victim of Russian bullying tactics, German officials reported that other 
governments displayed no particular interest in the case. 
7.  The Litvinenko case 
7.1  Political context of the case 
Traditionally treated by Russia as one of Europe’s great powers, the UK enjoyed close relations 
with Moscow in the early 2000s. In March 2000, the prime minister, Tony Blair, spearheaded a 
series of bilateral visits by Western leaders to court the then acting President Putin. After the 
9/11 attacks, the UK actively promoted Moscow’s alignment with the ‘war against terrorism’ 
and the creation of the NATO–Russia Council. Steadily growing trade flows, British foreign 
investment and the increasing importance of the London Stock Exchange for Russian companies 
underpinned the relationship. While business has continued to flourish, political ties have 
deteriorated sharply in recent years over London’s close alignment with Washington during the 
Iraq war and its growing criticism of Russian domestic politics. These differences have been 
reinforced by a series of bilateral disputes, in particular over asylum and extradition decisions. 
Over the period 2001–07, the UK refused repeated extradition requests by Russia for 13 
individuals and granted political asylum to high-profile figures such as Akhmed Zakayev and 
Boris Berezovsky.
36 
7.2  The substance and background of the dispute 
The dispute in this case focused on the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer 
and naturalised UK citizen, and the UK’s extradition request for the prime suspect. On 1 
November 2006, Litvinenko fell ill after meeting two former Russian intelligence officers, 
Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun, at a London hotel. He died on 23 November of poisoning 
with the radioactive isotope Polonium-210, which had presumably been ingested through a cup 
of tea consumed at the meeting. Having traced the polonium trails left by the three men, British 
officers undertook investigations in Moscow in December 2006. In May 2007, the Crown 
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Prosecution Service announced that sufficient evidence had been gathered to charge Lugovoy 
with murder and lodged an extradition request under the European Convention on Extradition of 
1957 (ECE).
37 
Russia rejected the request based on a constitutional ban on extraditing Russian citizens and Art. 
6.1 ECE. In line with the convention, Russia’s prosecutor general, Yury Chaika, offered to try 
Lugovoy in Russia, if London submitted additional evidence.
38 Russia had opened its own 
criminal case in 2006 and suggested that former Yukos Vice-President Leonid Nevzlin had 
played a role in the poisoning. The Russian investigation was inconclusive, however. The ECE 
only required London to submit a summary of the British investigation, but Moscow refused to 
comply with further cooperation requests, unless the British government released further crucial 
evidence, including the coroner’s report. At the political level, Moscow angrily denied any 
government involvement and portrayed Litvinenko’s murder as a well-rehearsed plan to 
discredit Russia. President Putin dismissed the UK’s insistence on the extradition as “a remnant 
of a colonial mindset” and pointed out that London had repeatedly rejected Russian extradition 
requests.
39 Instead of being extradited, Lugovoy was placed second on the Liberal Democratic 
Party list for the 2007 elections and obtained a Duma mandate providing him with 
parliamentary immunity. 
London categorically rejected the proposal of trying Lugovoy in Russia and instead suggested 
that Moscow should circumvent the constitutional difficulties. Reportedly, London feared that 
Russia could abuse the full evidence for a politically charged trial to acquit Lugovoy. As the 
dispute reached a deadlock, it subsequently spilled over into other areas. Against the 
background of long-standing difficulties with re-broadcasting arrangements, the BBC’s Russian 
Service was removed from two local FM partner stations in November 2006 and the Bolshoye 
Radio joint venture in Moscow in August 2007. On 25 October 2007, Russia demanded that the 
British Council freeze all operations outside Moscow as of January 2008. Among other 
allegations, Russia claimed that the regional offices in Yekaterinburg and St Petersburg 
operated without legal basis.
40 London denied any violations and insisted that a British–Russian 
framework agreement of 1994 on educational, scientific and cultural cooperation provided an 
adequate legal basis. 
7.3  The British government’s approach to the dispute 
The suspicious death of a former FSB officer and the contamination of numerous locations in 
London with a hazardous substance created considerable domestic pressure. Accordingly, 
London took a principled position and insisted on the unqualified observance of the rule of law. 
The government sought to avoid an escalation by framing the issue as a criminal matter dealt 
with by independent judicial bodies, but it simultaneously provided strong political backing. 
Blair insisted that “no political or diplomatic barrier would be allowed to stand in the way of the 
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38 Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Генеральная прокуратура Российской Федерации 
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General’s Office, Moscow, 5 July 2007. 
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British investigation”.
41 London repeatedly called in Moscow’s ambassador to demand full 
cooperation and raised the extradition request at top-level meetings, including the June 2007 G8 
summit. Simultaneously, the government cautiously refrained from suggesting any state 
involvement in Litvinenko’s death and continually underlined Russia’s importance as a partner 
in tackling common global challenges. 
All the same, the vigorous political backing created strong pressure for a reaction to Moscow’s 
rejection of the extradition request. On 16 July 2007, the new foreign secretary David Miliband 
announced that the UK was expelling four Russian diplomats, reviewing the extent of 
cooperation with Russia, suspending visa facilitation negotiations and raising Lugovoy’s 
extradition at the EU level. Moscow condemned the measures as a deliberate escalation and 
retaliated by expelling four British diplomats and reciprocating the visa restrictions. The UK 
government subsequently reduced the attention given to the issue, but it refused to drop the 
extradition request, issued a European arrest warrant for Lugovoy and continued to raise the 
matter with Moscow. The UK also openly defied the order to close the British Council and only 
suspended operations in St Petersburg and Yekaterinburg after the FSB summoned locally hired 
employees for individual interviews. Although Miliband insisted that the measures imposed in 
July 2007 would “continue to be administered rigorously”,
42 afterwards London tried to break 
the vicious circle and ruled out retaliating against Russian cultural activities in Britain. Instead, 
the UK made increasing efforts to repair bilateral relations and hoped for a thaw after the 
Russian presidential elections. In October 2008, in his role as UK business secretary, Peter 
Mandelson became the first cabinet minister to visit Russia since early 2007. Mandelson 
expressed a desire to re-engage and admitted that Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov was 
the first to mention the Litvinenko case during their meeting. The new UK ambassador to 
Moscow, Anne Pringle, was also less vocal on the issue than her predecessor was. While not 
formally retreating from its position, London stopped pushing the case and sought to improve 
bilateral ties by increasing dialogue and focusing on common interests. 
7.4 EU  involvement 
London regularly briefed its EU partners but did not push Litvinenko’s death onto the EU 
agenda as long as criminal investigations were underway. Even when London finally sought 
active support, the government treated EU involvement only as a backup for its position in the 
bilateral dispute. During a meeting of the Council’s Article 36 Committee on police and judicial 
cooperation, the UK reported on the planned extradition request and asked all member states to 
support the UK’s approach in their contacts with Russia.
43 Accordingly, the Council presidency 
backed the UK with a CFSP statement issued on 1 June 2007, which called upon Russia to 
cooperate constructively with the UK. A declaration issued after Miliband’s announcement of 
the diplomatic expulsions also expressed the EU’s disappointment with Moscow, but the 
Portuguese presidency emphasised the bilateral nature of the dispute and denied plans for 
further EU action. 
After Russia reciprocated the expulsions, London sought to avoid further escalation and did not 
request an EU response. Even though the EU continued to raise the case with Moscow, for 
example at the Permanent Partnership Council on Justice and Home Affairs of 22-23 November 
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2007, the issue was slowly slipping off the EU–Russian agenda until the standoff over the 
British Council. In response to Moscow’s ultimatum, the EU National Institutes for Culture sent 
Moscow a letter signed on behalf of the cultural institutes of 18 member states. The Portuguese 
presidency also issued a CFSP statement that “urge[d] the Russian Authorities to revisit their 
decision”.
44 Many governments considered Moscow’s crackdown on the British Council 
disgraceful and supported another CFSP declaration issued after the forced closure. Still, the 
UK refrained from insisting on a stronger EU response. Despite the lack of the desired results, 
the UK underlined its wish not to delay the strategic EU–Russia negotiations over the dispute. 
Instead, London satisfied itself with an agreement reached in June 2007 to annex a protocol 
declaration to the negotiating mandate, which in line with previous CFSP statements highlighted 
EU concerns regarding Lugovoy’s extradition.
45 
7.5  Assessing EU unity and support 
Despite the ostensible display of solidarity through consecutive declarations of support, the EU 
achieved only a medium degree of unity in the Litvinenko case. Because of the hints at a certain 
level of state involvement in Litvinenko’s poisoning, many governments were reluctant to 
become entangled in a potentially explosive bilateral dispute. Yet most member states supported 
the UK over the criminal investigation itself given the public health risk and the damage to 
national interests. European officials also welcomed that London was measured in its requests 
for EU involvement. In contrast, the UK’s diplomatic expulsions, which had been announced 
without prior consultation, only enjoyed limited backing. Although EU leaders understood the 
domestic pressure on the freshly inaugurated British government, several member states 
regarded the expulsions as an overreaction. As Moscow’s refusal of the extradition request did 
not violate its international obligations, the fact that London pushed for Lugovoy’s extradition 
on a rule-of-law basis while simultaneously calling upon Russia to circumvent its constitution 
also weakened EU support. 
Consequently, the UK received more muted expressions of support than desired. Despite an 
urgent request, the CFSP declaration of 18 July only emerged with delay and did not explicitly 
condone the UK’s expulsions. Likewise, the measured declaration on the British Council was 
published a week after the UK had announced that a strong EU statement was about to be 
issued. These differences did not provoke further difficulties, however, as London had been 
aware of the limited support, did not try to elicit stronger EU action and instead downgraded the 
dispute. 
8. Horizontal  findings 
This section aims at drawing together the findings of the above case studies for more general 
conclusions, which are also informed by several other cases referred to in the above overview of 
various types of disputes. 
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8.1  Government approaches to bilateral disputes 
As the case studies have illustrated, one should avoid firmly attributing a specific approach to a 
particular member state. Certain member states are undeniably more inclined to pursue a 
specific strategy than others do, but a government can simultaneously pursue different 
approaches towards various disputes. For example, Poland never treated the Vistula/Kaliningrad 
lagoon dispute with the same urgency as the agricultural ban and did not raise the Katyn dispute 
to the EU level at all. In addition, the policy pursued towards a particular dispute is by no means 
static, as governments adapt to changing circumstances and reconsider unsuccessful strategies. 
The emergence of a deadlock, a thaw in relations with Moscow or changes of government can 
be important turning points. Moreover, member state governments do not always constitute 
unitary actors in a dispute. For example, the Lufthansa case initially witnessed limited 
coordination among the ministries involved, which undermined the government’s position vis-à-
vis Moscow. 
Even though these findings caution against generalisations, the case studies allow for 
identifying certain patterns regarding the approaches taken by member state governments 
towards bilateral disputes. In particular, a certain distinction could be observed between more 
accommodative and more uncompromising government approaches. In the first category, the 
governments affected made visible efforts to avoid any escalation and accommodate Russian 
interests. In this respect, after initially taking a more uncompromising stance, Berlin abandoned 
its firm line and declared its readiness to negotiate mutually acceptable conditions for relocating 
the Lufthansa Cargo hub. This strategy is by no means confined to the old member states. In the 
context of improving Latvian–Russian relations in 2006–08, Riga took a very subdued approach 
towards Russian restrictions on Latvian sprats and eventually managed to negotiate their 
termination. The governments concerned frequently treated arising disputes as technical matters, 
played down their significance and only raised them to a higher level after exhausting expert-
level contacts. Even acknowledging its limits, numerous officials regard this as a tested strategy 
to allow for a face-saving resolution. Nevertheless, government approaches can seldom be 
described in dichotomous terms as ‘technical’ or ‘political’ and they do not necessarily evolve 
from low to high-level contacts. For instance, Steinmeier’s intervention in the Lufthansa case 
created a calmer setting for the subsequent technical negotiations. 
In contrast, several governments pursued a more uncompromising approach. For example, 
London categorically rejected Moscow’s offer of trying Lugovoy in Russia and Estonia denied 
Moscow any veto over the Bronze Soldier. Denmark and Lithuania also firmly resisted Russian 
pressure over the World Chechen Congress and the Mazeikiu refinery. Owing to the nature of 
the disputes and their high degree of domestic controversy, these cases were from the outset 
addressed at the highest political level. The member states concerned pursued a firm line 
towards Moscow, yet at the same time sought to avoid excessive escalation. At the farther end 
of the spectrum, the approach taken by Jaroslaw Kaczynski – who engaged in fierce rhetoric, 
sought to mobilise strong EU leverage and displayed limited concern for collateral damage to 
Polish–Russian or EU–Russian relations – could be described as openly confrontational. 
Many officials identify the avoidance of further damage to bilateral ties as the main motivation 
for accommodative strategies, but the reasons for the adoption of a specific approach mostly 
defy generalisation. In the cases examined, these decisions were influenced by a combination of 
numerous factors including the perceived damage to national interests, the state of bilateral 
relations and the degree of domestic pressure. Even though it appears that member state 
governments more readily adopt uncompromising strategies when bilateral ties with Moscow 
are already strained and domestic pressures are high, one should avoid making deterministic 
claims over the influence of these factors. After the British Council affair, for example, London 
took a conscientious decision to pursue a softer line despite the bilateral tensions and the BILATERAL DISPUTES BETWEEN EU MEMBER STATES AND RUSSIA | 23 
 
domestic outcry. In the case of the timber export duties, the domestic repercussions in terms of 
potential job losses encouraged the Finnish government to take a very firm stance towards 
Russia despite otherwise excellent bilateral relations. A government’s approach is hence subject 
to considerable discretion, yet can still be constrained by the specific nature of the dispute. For 
example, economic disputes between Russia and its main trade partners clearly offer more room 
for striking mutually beneficial deals than zero-sum conflicts over historical issues. 
Despite these caveats, historical experience and domestic factors go a long way towards 
accounting for certain differences between the old and some new member states. 
Uncompromising strategies were not confined to the new member states, but the degree of 
politicisation on the part of both Moscow and the member state governments concerned was 
frequently higher in these cases. For example, the rhetorical devices deployed by several Polish 
and Baltic leaders, such as the description of the agricultural “embargo” by Polish foreign 
minister Anna Fotyga as a “kind of declaration of war” differed substantially from the language 
used elsewhere. Given their recent past, several new member states are particularly sensitive if 
Russia does not treat them as genuinely sovereign. In particular, Kaczynski framed the import 
ban as a dispute over Poland’s status as a full-fledged EU member state. Even though all the 
disputes examined reverberated with a strong domestic echo, the governments of several new 
member states frequently face greater domestic pressures, as policy towards Russia remains an 
integral part of domestic politics in these countries. For the same reason, political leaders can be 
tempted to play on bilateral disputes to shore up political support, as suggested by the 
approaches of Ansip and Kaczynski. In contrast, the UK and other old member states are 
generally not perceived as domestically exploiting disputes with Russia, even if London’s 
approach to the Litvinenko case was likewise influenced by domestic considerations. 
Even in highly politicised cases, the use of counter-leverage by member state governments 
remained conspicuously limited. Except for the EU counter-pressure deployed by Warsaw and 
Vilnius, most governments only employed the threat of countermeasures as a negotiating tactic. 
For example, the UK sent a political signal with the diplomatic expulsions in the Litvinenko 
case but refrained from retaliating against Russian cultural activities during the dispute over the 
British Council. Similarly, Berlin’s suspension of Aeroflot’s landing rights was rescinded within 
a day, and Lithuania did not implement a threat to close the railway connection between 
Kaliningrad and mainland Russia. This restraint has several foundations. First, all member states 
are based on the rule of law, which proscribes arbitrarily violating agreements or imposing 
sanctions without sound legal basis. Moscow takes this into account by exploiting legal 
loopholes, acting through proxies and imposing restrictions in a manner not openly violating its 
obligations.
46 Second, available counter-leverage is frequently offset by dependence on Russia 
for energy supplies and cooperation in other areas, and most governments thus seek to avoid 
excessive escalation. Whereas Russia occasionally takes action hurting its own long-term 
interests, most member states resist taking such measures. Notably, Helsinki deemed it counter-
productive to block Russia’s WTO accession over the timber export duties, as Russian WTO 
accession is in Finland’s long-term interest. As illustrated by Aeroflot’s successful tactic of 
threatening to relocate its operations to Luxembourg, the EU’s lack of coherence often prevents 
it from bringing Russia’s dependence on the EU to bear in such matters. Third, the British case 
suggests that counter-measures such as the diplomatic expulsions can be interpreted as 
unnecessary escalation and diminish EU support. While Russia occasionally ignores 
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reputational costs, for instance over the British Council, the interest of most member state 
governments in maintaining international respectability prohibits similar measures. 
8.2  EU involvement in bilateral disputes 
As the case studies show, most governments routinely consult the European Commission about 
arising trade-related disputes irrespective of the further course of action. The disputes falling 
into Community competence were subsequently addressed by the European Commission, but 
numerous trade-related cases falling outside exclusive Community competence, such as the 
Latvian sprats, TNK-BP or the Lufthansa Cargo disputes, were actually not placed onto the EU–
Russian agenda. EU officials report that in particular the larger member states often deem it 
more promising to resolve disputes on a bilateral basis. Besides possessing well-established 
bilateral channels to address arising problems, larger member states face lower incentives for 
EU involvement owing to the limited gains of additional leverage. Furthermore, governments 
often seek to avoid the additional politicisation associated with EU involvement. Indeed, many 
bilateral disputes are only raised at Moscow’s initiative. For example, Moscow has brought up 
the Baltic States’ alleged persecution of Soviet WWII veterans and tried to discuss the Czech–
Polish missile defence plans with Brussels. As the Estonian case shows, bilateral disputes can 
thus unexpectedly spill over into EU–Russian ties even in spite of efforts by the government 
concerned to keep the issue bilateral. During the crisis, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov 
accused the EU of conniving with Estonian attempts to rewrite history and several hundred 
activists picketed the European Commission’s Moscow delegation on 4 May 2007. 
Even in cases of strained ties with Moscow, most government requests for EU support were 
actually preceded by attempts to resolve the dispute through bilateral channels. Bilateral 
contacts usually continued in parallel with EU efforts and even cases falling into exclusive 
Community competence (such as the timber export duties) continued to witness extensive 
bilateral talks. Whereas many governments only requested stronger EU involvement after 
bilateral contacts had been exhausted, several disputes like the Mazeikiu refinery case were 
raised relatively quickly. EU officials report that smaller member states tend to exert stronger 
pressure on Brussels owing to the relatively larger gains of leverage and a perceived 
powerlessness to resolve the issue bilaterally. Irrespective of a member state’s size, domestic 
expectations can also facilitate EU involvement in a particular dispute, if the government 
concerned seeks to demonstrate a high level of activity to the public. In other cases, member 
state governments request EU involvement in the hope of containing an acute crisis or of 
avoiding an unmediated bilateral confrontation with Moscow in the first place. Among the 
various categories, trade-related disputes are more readily raised to the EU level, as the defence 
of European commercial interests is regarded as the EU’s core business. In contrast, the member 
states are more selective over genuinely bilateral disputes falling into the political realm. For 
example, the UK never formally requested EU support regarding the harassment campaign 
against Ambassador Brenton. In particular, certain categories including espionage affairs or 
historical disputes are with few exceptions tackled on a bilateral basis. Despite recent initiatives 
to discuss the crimes of totalitarian regimes at the EU level, most officials do not regard 
Brussels as the appropriate venue for addressing historical disputes and have refrained from 
pushing individual cases such as the dispute over the Katyn investigation files. 
In most instances, the requests for EU support resulted in relatively extensive measures being 
taken at the EU level. In spite of the limits of EU action over disputes falling outside 
Community competence, most officials considered EU support over these disputes as very 
substantial. Still, given the controversial nature of specific disputes, for example the agricultural 
ban, the relevant Commission services did not always appear to take a coherent position 
regarding the desirable degree of Commission involvement. Commission Vice-President Günter BILATERAL DISPUTES BETWEEN EU MEMBER STATES AND RUSSIA | 25 
 
Verheugen also contradicted the EU line in the Finnish case by stating that the timber 
“importers have been treating Russia as a third-world country”.
47 Crucially, government 
expectations towards EU support after the invocation of solidarity differed dramatically. Despite 
requesting support, London did not regard the EU as the primary channel for solving the 
Litvinenko dispute and Tallinn was aware of its thin political capital. In these and other cases 
(the Latvian Ventspils terminal or the timber export duties), the governments affected never 
insisted on a resolution. In contrast, the Polish veto catapulted the agricultural ban to the top of 
the EU–Russian agenda. Similar to the Mazeikiu case, Warsaw tabled the veto amid open 
complaints about lacking EU support and the perception that Poland was being treated as a 
second-class member of the EU. 
8.3  Patterns of EU unity and support 
As the above cases illustrate, the EU had severe difficulties in forging a common stance over the 
various disputes. Although the principle of EU solidarity as such is not disputed, EU support 
appears to be subject to certain conditions. Moreover, the views among the member states on 
the scope and practical implications of EU solidarity diverge significantly. Most governments 
recognise that the EU cannot entirely ignore bilateral disputes and accept the legitimacy of 
raising economic disputes with a certain relevance to Community competence. Even though the 
majority of member states emphasise that genuinely bilateral disputes should normally remain 
bilateral, many capitals are also open to the idea of issuing a general declaration of EU 
solidarity in these cases to support the bilateral efforts of the government concerned. 
In contrast, the calls for extensive EU involvement in individual, highly politicised cases and the 
strategies used by certain governments to elicit EU support triggered controversial discussions. 
At one end of the spectrum, several governments consider extensive EU involvement in 
individual disputes undesirable and emphasise the need to seek an agreement with Russia 
bilaterally. Others readily accept the legitimacy of placing substantive cases onto the EU–
Russian agenda, provided they affect important national interests and the government concerned 
has already exhausted its own possibilities. To a certain extent, the disagreements over the scope 
of EU solidarity reflect the long-standing divisions between the member states traditionally 
pursuing close bilateral ties with Moscow and those supporting a more assertive and genuinely 
common EU policy towards Russia. At the same time, even the latter group voices concerns 
about the risk of paralysis in EU–Russian relations over a growing number of bilateral disputes. 
More specifically, Warsaw’s use of the veto proved particularly divisive. Notwithstanding the 
legal uncertainties, most officials deemed the complaint about insufficient support unjustified 
and resented that Poland had tabled its veto in the face of considerable EU efforts. Whereas 
other governments correctly anticipated the limits to EU solidarity, Poland’s and Lithuania’s 
attempts to ‘force’ stronger support were met with incomprehension and revealed the absence of 
a consensus on the scope of EU solidarity. As the respective disputes caused only limited 
material damage, the blocking of the EU–Russia negotiations over largely symbolic disputes 
was widely regarded as grossly disproportionate. Many officials complained that the two 
governments did not reciprocate solidarity and ignored collective EU interests, as they rejected 
or even refused to discuss consecutive compromise proposals. As other member states generally 
sought to avoid letting bilateral disputes substantially damage EU–Russian relations, most 
governments deemed it illegitimate that Kaczynski appeared to have used the dispute to push 
the EU into taking a more assertive line with Russia and actually to have welcomed the frostier 
climate. 
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In addition, several governments questioned the extent to which Warsaw and Vilnius genuinely 
worked towards a resolution of the respective disputes. In view of Russia’s emphasis on 
equality in EU–Russian relations, most officials deemed it futile to attempt to pressure Moscow 
into open submission in a politicised dispute. Consequently, Poland and Lithuania were 
perceived as insisting on their firm approaches as a matter of principle, which contravened the 
EU’s emphasis on seeking compromise and trading mutual concessions. Likewise, the strong 
politicisation of certain cases through the use of populist rhetoric, for example Polish and 
Estonian threats to ‘veto’ the Samara summit, was regarded as unhelpful to EU efforts to 
address the disputes. The impression that some leaders placed more emphasis on dramatic 
public posturing than on professionally solving a problem considerably strained EU solidarity. 
The cases examined also suggest that EU solidarity has certain limits, if other member states 
regard the damage incurred in a dispute as partially self-inflicted, notably if a government seems 
deliberately to pick an avoidable fight with Moscow in knowledge of the likely consequences. 
In particular, many governments regarded the relocation of the Bronze Soldier to have 
unnecessarily provoked an open conflict with Russia. Even though most governments recognise 
that Moscow shares considerable responsibility, many old member states remain critical of the 
persistent historiographical conflicts involving several new member states and are very reluctant 
with respect to any EU involvement in historically charged disputes. 
In more procedural terms, the communication and information policies of member state 
governments also appear to affect EU support. While Warsaw cooperated efficiently to address 
the veterinary issues, the Polish veto was poorly prepared and caused considerable surprise. 
Lithuania also triggered resentment by sending contradictory signals over its veto and by tabling 
numerous additional requests for support at a late stage. In several other cases, EU officials 
report that despite requesting assistance, member state governments do not always provide 
sufficient information to allow the EU to defend their interests effectively. Finally, legal 
considerations seem to influence the evaluation of requests for solidarity. For example, the fact 
that Moscow’s rejection of the extradition request did not violate its international obligations 
limited support for London’s retaliatory measures. It also caused consternation that the Polish 
export problems were not directly related to the content of the negotiating directives vetoed. 
Consequently, the EU’s ostensible unity at the Samara summit masked considerable divisions 
over the legitimacy of the respective cases. The main motivation for the strong display of 
solidarity with the governments concerned was the insight that the Union could not allow itself 
to be split by Russia and that it had to remain the EU’s prerogative to determine vis-à-vis third 
countries which issues are considered bilateral. Most governments also regarded it as a 
fundamental matter of credibility for the Union to support a member state facing severe pressure 
from Moscow irrespective of potential reservations. At the same time, the convergence among 
the member states has remained limited and the differences over the scope and practical 
implications of EU solidarity persist. 
9.  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This final section draws on the above findings to make several recommendations for the EU’s 
approach to bilateral disputes. As this paper has argued, bilateral disputes are by no means a 
recent phenomenon or exclusive to the EU’s relations with Russia. Moreover, only a small share 
of the numerous bilateral disputes directly affects the EU, as many cases are never raised in 
Brussels. The problem of bilateral disputes in EU–Russian relations should therefore not be 
blown out of proportion, but the case studies have confirmed the disruptive potential of such 
frictions. Besides the substantial risk of direct spillover, persistent tensions between some 
member states and Russia over acrimonious disputes undeniably affect EU interests. 
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towards Russia. In the long term, a credible EU foreign policy requires the member states to 
support each other in serious bilateral disputes. Otherwise, an incoherent EU will not only lose 
global influence and invite divide-and-rule policies, disenchanted member states perceiving a 
lack of EU solidarity will also turn to other partners like Washington. Conversely, if EU–
Russian relations are persistently obstructed by bilateral disputes, the large member states will 
pursue their ties with Moscow outside the common framework. 
Despite a certain rapprochement in EU–Russian relations, these problems remain on the agenda. 
To address the issue, the member states should attempt to build a consensus on a set of political 
guidelines for governments seeking support from their EU counterparts and the EU as a whole. 
As suggested elsewhere,
48 the European Council could formally adopt these guidelines as a 
political agreement. Even though the record suggests that agreements without independent 
enforcement mechanisms have always been subject to defections and different interpretations, 
occasional violations do not entirely invalidate political agreements, whose major purpose is to 
shape government conduct and avoid norm violations in the first place. 
The objective of any guidelines must be to balance the interests involved by maximising the 
prospects for effective solidarity in a serious dispute while minimising the fallout for collective 
EU interests. Any guidelines must also recognise the need for flexibility. Bearing in mind the 
wide diversity of disputes, one cannot expect full convergence towards a common EU approach 
to bilateral disputes. The range of viable measures often depends on unique circumstances and 
there is no silver bullet for resolving a dispute. Nevertheless, this does not imply the absence of 
common minimum standards. Given the risk of spillover, member state governments need to 
recognise certain constraints on the handling of a bilateral dispute, even over matters within 
their exclusive competence. In terms of EU involvement, the member states must in any case 
retain the discretion to seek various degrees of EU support. A strong display of solidarity may 
be required to defuse a crisis, but discreet technical support or a gradual increase of political 
pressure could be more suitable in other cases. Likewise, the requirements placed upon 
governments seeking EU support should vary and be stricter for genuinely bilateral disputes 
than for cases on the border of Community competence or acute crises. The following proposals 
focus on genuinely bilateral disputes involving substantial EU support, because of the greater 
levels of controversy surrounding them. 
9.1  Proposed guidelines for the EU’s approach to bilateral disputes 
Irrespective of possible EU involvement, the member states should always seek to minimise 
potential damage to the EU. Whereas it is not always possible to negotiate an agreement, for 
example, if Moscow deliberately escalates a dispute, openly confrontational strategies should 
be avoided where possible. The unnecessary politicisation of second-rank disputes through shrill 
rhetoric not only renders a face-saving exit impossible, it also diminishes the scope for 
constructive EU involvement and support from other capitals. Leaders should also refrain from 
pursuing disputes for predominantly domestic purposes. Furthermore, the prospect of solidarity 
must not induce governments to take greater risks in a dispute and fall victim to the pitfalls of 
‘moral hazard’. 
To avoid an erosion of solidarity, strong support should be requested very selectively. EU 
solidarity rests on mutual trust and ‘diffuse reciprocity’, i.e. the approximate balancing of 
mutual concessions over the long term. Although specific circumstances need to be taken into 
                                                      
48 A. Wilson, N. Popescu and P. Noël, The future of EU–Russian relations. A way forward in solidarity 
and the rule of law, Briefing Paper, Policy Department, External Policies, European Parliament, Brussels, 
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account, EU solidarity will diminish if individual governments request support with grossly 
disproportionate frequency or over mostly symbolic issues. Instead, strong EU support should 
be reserved for cases involving very important national interests. Before requesting support, the 
affected governments also should have engaged in substantial bilateral efforts. 
As these requirements place the burden of proof on member states seeking support, the 
governments concerned need to adapt their communication policies accordingly. To build 
mutual trust, member state governments should provide detailed information about emerging 
disputes at an early stage. This requires non-affected member states to duly familiarise 
themselves with the problems facing their EU partners. Requests for EU support should be 
communicated in a timely and unambiguous fashion, which necessitates that governments 
enforce a coherent position within their administrations. Not all of these criteria will be met 
evenly, but they do require governments seeking support to exercise considerable restraint. 
Hence, it is imperative that upon request EU support is provided in a prompt and effective 
manner. If deemed necessary, other member states should be ready to raise the dispute in their 
own contacts with Moscow in coordination with the Council presidency. Member state 
governments must also refrain from undercutting each other during a dispute, which renders 
counter-leverage less effective and allows Russia to impose sanctions by shifting benefits from 
one member to another. 
To render EU support effective, the government involved should carefully discuss its actions 
with the EU and promptly implement EU recommendations. While that member state retains the 
major responsibility for resolving the dispute, a single government cannot force a particular 
approach towards Moscow on the EU. Governments invoking support should reciprocate 
solidarity and display a readiness for compromise towards both Moscow and Brussels. 
Conversely, the EU must refrain from compelling a government to accept massive concessions. 
Finally, requests for EU support must be proportionate  to the damage inflicted and the 
consequences for the EU. Governments should refrain from insisting on the pursuit of objectives 
that are evidently not achievable or could not be attained despite sustained efforts. Collective 
EU action is no panacea and the opportunity costs of sustained EU efforts can by far outweigh 
the damage inflicted. In these cases, EU support might be better aimed at alleviating  the 
problem, for example by helping to open new markets for banned exports, while temporarily 
relegating the dispute to a lower order. 
9.2  Further mechanisms and institutions 
The adoption of political guidelines should not be a prerequisite for considering other 
mechanisms to strengthen EU coherence. In particular, all member state governments should 
adopt administrative directives to ensure coherent information policies and common procedures, 
for example by creating prior consultation requirements for the use of counter-measures. The 
directives should stipulate a comprehensive exchange of information with EU partners making 
full use of existing channels like the EU’s COREU network. As many disputes arise in technical 
areas, the foreign ministries or prime minister’s offices should early on be quietly involved to 
ensure inter-ministerial coordination. Likewise, the European Commission could examine ways 
to strengthen its procedures for ensuring coherence in a dispute involving several Commission 
services. 
On the EU level, a reinforced, specific review mechanism for bilateral disputes based on the 
existing arrangements could increase the visibility of bilateral disputes. That being stated, the 
drawbacks of a strengthened formal mechanism appear to outweigh its advantages, as an official 
EU catalogue of bilateral disputes might in the long term accelerate the tendency to place minor 
disputes onto the EU–Russian agenda. The record also shows that a formal stocktaking exercise 
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from submitting information. Instead, regular, informal reporting sessions on bilateral disputes 
should be held on the fringes of COEST capital meetings to ensure adequate exchanges about 
simmering conflicts. If desired, a summary of these exchanges could be presented to the 
Gymnich-type, informal foreign ministers’ meetings. 
Given the need for flexibility, it is unfeasible to create a general solidarity mechanism that 
would automatically trigger a set of EU measures in a dispute. Nonetheless, sectoral solidarity 
mechanisms could be established for areas in which prompt support is imperative and the 
required EU measures are evident. Concerning the security of natural gas supplies, for instance, 
a robust EU mechanism including a detailed contingency plan for allocating available gas 
supplies and infrastructure capacities during a supply crisis should be established. Any 
significant supply disruption should activate efforts in non-affected member states to free 
supplies through interruptible contracts, storage withdrawal or fuel-switching for the effective 
provision of solidarity.
49 
Finally, the Council Secretariat and the European Commission could compile an inventory of 
EU measures and lessons learned from past disputes. While the review of lessons learned could 
promote internal debate, the inventory could assist the EU in weighing various options during a 
dispute. These could include trilateral consultations under Commission auspices, fact-finding 
missions by the Commission and the Council, various formats for international mediation, as 
well as linkage strategies with Russian interests. As the EU’s leverage frequently depends on 
Moscow’s international obligations, the EU should continue to promote Russia’s inclusion into 
multilateral governance frameworks. The conclusion of a comprehensive EU–Russia agreement, 
which should comprise the main principles of the Energy Charter Treaty and a deep free trade 
agreement with effective dispute-settlement provisions, could further mitigate the problem of 
(bilateral) disputes in EU–Russian relations. 
                                                      
49 For a detailed discussion of natural gas supply security in the EU–Russian context, which is beyond the 
confines of this document, see P. Noël, Beyond dependence: How to deal with Russian gas, ECFR Policy 
Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2008.  
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